EHRM 26 maart 2026, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0326JUD003269423
Tekst
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF D.M. v. SWEDEN
(Application no. 32694/23)
JUDGMENT
Art 3 • Expulsion • Deportation of Afghan national of Hazara ethnicity to Afghanistan would entail violation of Art 3 • Serious general security and human rights situation in Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover in 2021 not sufficient to conclude that any removal thereto would necessarily breach Art 3 • Situation of Hazaras, albeit dire, not such as to consider them a group systematically exposed to ill-treatment attaining the level of Art 3 • Existence of individual risk-enhancing factors including applicant’s ethnicity, area of origin to which he would be returned, long stay in Sweden, “westernisation”, and behaviour perceived as transgressing religious and moral norms in Afghanistan • Lack of a cumulative risk assessment in the relevant domestic decisions • Real risk of ill-treatment based on the cumulative effect of the applicant’s personal circumstances in the light of the general human rights situation and that of Hazaras in Afghanistan
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.
STRASBOURG
26 March 2026
FINAL
26/06/2026
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of D.M. v. Sweden,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Ivana Jelić, President, Erik Wennerström, Raffaele Sabato, Davor Derenčinović, Alain Chablais, Artūrs Kučs, Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges, and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 32694/23) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Afghan national, Mr D.M. (“the applicant”), on 16 August 2023;
the decision to give notice to the Swedish Government (“the Government”) of the application;
the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;
the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court);
the decision to indicate an interim measure to the respondent Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and the fact that this interim measure has been complied with;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 3 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1 The case concerns the applicant’s removal order from Sweden to Afghanistan following his unsuccessful applications for asylum. He complained that his removal would be in breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and that the domestic proceedings had not complied with the standards required under those Articles, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention.
THE FACTS
2 The applicant was represented by Mr D. Öberg Loveday, a lawyer practising in Berlin, Germany.
3 The Government were represented by their Agents, Mr V. Hagstedt and Ms L. Helgeby, both of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
4 The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
Asylum application and initial proceedings
5 On 16 October 2015 the applicant applied for asylum in Sweden. Two days later the Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) held an introductory interview with him in the presence of an interpreter. The applicant stated, inter alia, that he was from Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan, where he had lived with his older sister, that his parents were dead, and that he was 16 and a half years old. His date of birth was registered as 16 April 1999 – he was thus treated as an unaccompanied minor and appointed a legal guardian (god man för ensamkommande barn) and a legal representative (offentligt biträde).
6 Since the applicant had previously been registered as an asylum seeker in Germany, proceedings were initiated regarding a possible transfer in accordance with the provisions in the Dublin Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third‑country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ 2013, L 180, p. 31). It followed from information provided by the German authorities that in Germany the applicant had been registered under a different name than the one he had given in Sweden and with a different date of birth, namely 1 January 1993.
7 On 26 April 2016, following an age assessment interview with the applicant and receipt of written submissions from the applicant’s legal representative, the Migration Agency decided to reject the applicant’s asylum application and transfer him to Germany in accordance with the Dublin Regulation. It considered that he had failed to provide an acceptable explanation as to why he had been registered as an adult and under a different name by the German authorities and that his statement during the age assessment interview had also been lacking in other aspects. Moreover, he had declined to undergo a medical age assessment and had no identity documents. In an overall assessment the Migration Agency considered that there were no reasons to question the date of birth which had been registered in Germany and that the applicant had not established as probable (gjort sannolikt) that he was a minor. His date of birth was therefore re-registered as 1 January 1993, meaning that he was considered an adult in Sweden. Consequently, and in view of the other circumstances of the case, the Migration Agency found no reasons not to apply the Dublin Regulation.
8 The applicant appealed against that decision. While his appeal was pending the time-limit for the transfer to Germany expired. The Migration Court quashed the Migration Agency’s decision on that ground and returned the applicant’s asylum application to the Migration Agency for further processing, without adjudicating the dispute about the applicant’s age.
First set of asylum proceedings
The Migration Agency
9 On 31 January 2017 the Migration Agency held an asylum interview with the applicant. Two supplementary interviews were held on 8 June 2017 and 13 September 2017. The applicant’s State appointed legal representative and interpreters were present during all three interviews. The minutes from the interviews were sent to the applicant’s legal representative for review and the legal representative subsequently made written submissions.
10 In support of his asylum application the applicant essentially submitted that he would be at risk of being killed in Afghanistan owing to a land dispute and his participation in a demonstration, and that he would be at risk of persecution there because of his conversion to Christianity.
11 On 26 October 2017 the Migration Agency dismissed the applicant’s request for asylum and ordered his deportation to Afghanistan.
12 It found, at the outset, that he had not established as probable his identity, including the age he claimed to be. The Migration Agency, among other things, remarked that he had provided the German authorities with a different name and date of birth than the ones he had provided in Sweden and considered that he had not given an acceptable explanation for that. Moreover, he had not been able to provide sufficient information during his age assessment interview and he had declined to undergo a medical age assessment. The Migration Agency considered that he had deliberately tried to mislead the Swedish authorities concerning his identity, which also affected his general credibility.
13 Nevertheless, it found that he had established as probable that he was an Afghan national, though he had not established any place of residence as probable. The Agency therefore assessed his case in relation to all of Afghanistan.
14 As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, the Migration Agency noted that he had submitted a certificate showing that he had been baptised on 10 August 2016 and thus did not question that he had been baptised or that he attended church. However, it held that the submitted documents did not show that he had converted based on a genuine conviction.
15 The Migration Agency assessed the statements he made during the asylum interviews regarding his conversion and his faith as being vague, lacking in detail and inconsistent. It further noted that he had stated that his sister and one other person in his area of origin knew about his conversion and that he had stated that he had spread information about Christianity on Facebook. However, it found that there were reasons to doubt whether anyone in Afghanistan knew about his conversion. Even if two people knew that he had visited a church there was no indication that that information had been spread in Afghanistan. Nor was there any indication that his post on Facebook would be spread in Afghanistan, and it was uncertain that it could even be tied to him since he had not established as probable his identity. The Migration Agency also noted that in Afghanistan he had lived as a Muslim, regularly gone to the mosque and observed Muslim holidays.
16 It concluded that he had not submitted a reliable account of having converted based on a genuine religious conviction, or of his intention to live as a Christian in Afghanistan. Nor had he submitted a reliable account of his having been attributed a dissenting religious belief in Afghanistan. He was thus not considered to have established as probable that he risked treatment warranting protection in Afghanistan on those grounds.
17 As to the land dispute, the Migration Agency noted that the applicant had claimed that the provincial leader had required all Hazaras to pay a sum of money per acre of land that they owned, but that no one had lost their land, and that nothing had happened to the applicant personally on account of that. Furthermore, the information the applicant had provided about his alleged participation in a demonstration had been vague, lacking in detail and inconsistent, and certain statements had been based on speculation and second-hand information. In an overall assessment, the Migration Agency did not consider that the applicant had provided reliable information about being at risk on account of a land dispute or for participating in a demonstration should he return to Afghanistan.
18 Furthermore, it noted that the applicant was of Hazara origin but that it had not emerged that he had been subjected to discrimination or persecution such that he could be considered a refugee. He had lived in an area mostly inhabited by Hazaras, had attended school and had been able to work.
19 Lastly, the Migration Agency assessed the general security situation in Afghanistan and noted that in, for example, Kabul, Herat and Balkh (Mazar-e Sharif) there was an ongoing armed conflict. However, the situation in those three provinces was not so serious that everyone risked ill-treatment upon return there and the applicant had not established as probable that he faced any individual risks. There were international airports in Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul, and he could settle in one of those provinces.
20 For those reasons the applicant was not deemed to be eligible for refugee status or for subsidiary protection. Moreover, the circumstances in his case were not considered to be exceptionally distressing within the meaning of Chapter 5, section 6, of the Aliens Act (utlänningslagen, 2005:716). Thus, he was not entitled to a residence permit and his deportation was ordered.
The Migration Court
21 The applicant appealed against the Migration Agency’s decision to the Luleå Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen vid Förvaltningsrätten i Luleå). The applicant and the Migration Agency made written submissions and the court held an oral hearing. The applicant essentially reiterated his grounds for asylum and made further submissions about the genuineness of his conversion to Christianity. The Migration Agency contested the appeal but conceded that the applicant had established as probable that Mazar-e Sharif had been his place of residence and that he could not be referred to an internal flight alternative in the event that the court found his submissions concerning the land dispute or conversion to be credible.
22 On 14 March 2018 the Migration Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
23 The court agreed with the Migration Agency that the applicant had not established his identity as probable, but that he had established as probable that he was from Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan. His need for protection was therefore to be assessed in relation to that area.
24 The court found that the general situation in Mazar-e Sharif was not so serious that it, in itself, entitled the applicant to a residence permit in Sweden.
25 It further found that although the situation for Hazaras in Afghanistan was difficult, the situation was not such that merely belonging to that group was sufficient for there to be a general need for protection. In view of that, and since the applicant had no individual grounds linked to his being Hazara, he could not be granted a residence permit on that basis.
26 The court further emphasised that the applicant had given another identity when he had applied for asylum in Germany and had not provided an acceptable explanation for that, which had a negative impact on his general credibility.
27 As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, the court considered the written evidence provided by the applicant, the testimony of a pastor who had been heard as a witness at the applicant’s request and the applicant’s own statements. The court pointed out that the applicant had converted after having arrived in Sweden and that the question of credibility therefore warranted particular attention. It found that the applicant’s statements regarding his faith and his conversion were vague and general in nature. Parts of them appeared to be recitations of phrases learned by rote and his account was based primarily on social norms and a generally negative attitude towards Islam. In the court’s view it was remarkable that he had been unable to give an account on a deeper level of his choice to convert. He had also been unable to answer knowledge-based questions about Christianity in a satisfactory way. Overall, the applicant had not established as probable that his conversion to Christianity had been based on a genuine religious conviction. Therefore, he had also not established as probable that he intended to live as a Christian upon return.
28 As to the risk that his conversion to Christianity might have become known in Afghanistan, the court noted that the applicant had stated that he had posted Christian messages on social media and told his sister about his conversion, which had resulted in her husband, who was a very religious man, threatening to kill the applicant for being an apostate. The court found that since the applicant had not established his identity, including the name he was using in Sweden, as probable, his activities on social media under that name did not establish that it was probable that he risked treatment warranting protection on that ground. Moreover, his claims regarding the alleged threat from his sister’s husband were based on hearsay and speculation and there were inconsistencies in his statements about the threat. In view of that, and of the fact that the court did not consider him credible in general, it concluded that he had not established as probable that he was at risk of treatment warranting protection owing to an attributed religious belief.
29 Regarding the land dispute, the court noted that the applicant had stated that no one had taken the land during the four to five years that he had been away from Afghanistan. Considering that the community leaders had respected his ownership during his time abroad, the court concluded that they could not be considered to pose a threat to him upon return. His claims that his sister’s husband wanted to kill him and take over the land were not considered to be credible. Moreover, the court found that his statements regarding risks he faced owing to his having participated in a demonstration connected to the land dispute were not credible since, inter alia, he had given differing accounts of the demonstration and his involvement in it.
30 In sum, the court found that the applicant had not established as probable that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan, or that there were substantial grounds to believe that he would risk being subjected to treatment and/or punishment warranting protection. The court also found that there were not any extraordinarily distressing circumstances in his case.
The Migration Court of Appeal
31 On 17 May 2018 the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen) denied the applicant leave to appeal.
Proceedings while the first deportation order was in force
32 During the period from May 2018 until the end of 2020 the applicant made several requests to be granted a residence permit on the basis of impediments to the enforcement of the deportation order or to be granted a re-examination of his application for asylum, essentially relying on the same grounds as before, as well as on developments in the situation in Afghanistan and his adaptation to Swedish society. Those requests were all refused by the Migration Agency and the decisions upheld on appeal, essentially on the grounds that there were no new circumstances which constituted impediments to enforcement or grounds for granting a re-examination. However, the applicant was granted a temporary residence permit valid from 30 October 2018 to 30 November 2019 for the purpose of studies at upper secondary level, pursuant to the Act on Temporary Restrictions on the Possibility of Obtaining a Residence Permit in Sweden (lagen om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige, 2016:752). His requests to extend that permit were subsequently refused.
33 The applicant then lodged another application for a residence permit or a re-examination, which the Migration Agency refused on 9 July 2021, finding that there were no new circumstances constituting impediments to enforcement of the deportation order or grounds for granting him a re-examination. On 24 August 2021 the Migration Court quashed that decision and referred the case back to the Migration Agency for further processing owing to developments in Afghanistan and a new legal position paper from the Migration Agency, dated 23 July 2021, which imposed a decision-making moratorium in cases concerning Afghanistan owing to the uncertain situation there. Subsequently, in June 2022, the case was struck out by the Migration Agency on the basis that the applicant’s deportation order had expired and was thus no longer in force (Chapter 12, section 22, of the Aliens Act, as in force at the relevant time).
Second set of asylum proceedings
The Migration Agency
34 On 13 June 2022 the applicant applied afresh for asylum in Sweden. On 5 September 2022, the Migration Agency held an asylum interview with him, in the presence of his new State appointed legal representative and an interpreter. The minutes from the asylum investigation were communicated to the applicant’s legal representative for review. The legal representative subsequently made written submissions.
35 The applicant reasserted the same grounds for protection as he had in his previous application, namely the land dispute, his participation in a demonstration, his conversion to Christianity and his Hazara ethnicity. In regard to his conversion he submitted, inter alia, that he had continued to attend church regularly, that his faith had deepened and that he had received threats on social media because of the messages he had spread there. He submitted various documents, including statements from members of his congregation, in support of his claims regarding his conversion. He also stated that he had, in any event, turned his back on Islam and that practicing Islam on his return to Afghanistan, as the Taliban would require, would be spiritually and practically impossible for him. In addition, he claimed that he risked being exposed to treatment warranting protection because the Taliban had taken power in Afghanistan and because he had become “westernised” during his time in Sweden.
36 On 27 March 2023, the Migration Agency dismissed the applicant’s request for asylum and ordered his deportation to Afghanistan.
37 In the decision, while listing the evidence in the case, the Migration Agency noted that it had added the following country of origin information on Afghanistan to the case file: European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Afghanistan – Security Situation, Country of Origin Information Report, August 2022 (pages 21-23 and 99-102) and EUAA, Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals, Country of Origin Information Report, August 2022 (pages 41, 49-54 and 132-37). The Agency also listed several reports and articles which the applicant had added to the case file.
38 At the outset, the Migration Agency found that the applicant had still not established as probable his identity, even considering that he had submitted a document from his relatives in Sweden attesting to his identity. However, it found no reason to depart from the previous assessment that he was from Mazar-e Sharif and that his need for protection should be assessed in relation to the conditions there.
39 Regarding the applicant’s claims related to a land dispute and participation in a demonstration, the Migration Agency found no reason to depart from the assessment made in the first asylum proceedings.
40 As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, it took note of the written evidence and stated that it found no reason to doubt that he had been baptised or that he participated in activities organised by the church in question. However, the written evidence was not sufficient, by itself, to establish as probable that his faith had deepened or that he had converted out of a genuine conviction. The Migration Agency went on to assess his oral statements in that regard and found that they had been vague, that he had been unable to account for his feelings and reflections regarding his faith and that his reasoning was mainly based on the difference between Afghan and Western society. Noting that a total of five oral interviews had been held with him, during which he had been given the opportunity to account for his religious beliefs, the Migration Agency found no reason to depart from the earlier assessment. It therefore concluded that he had not provided reliable information about having converted based on a genuine conviction or that he intended to live as a Christian in Afghanistan.
41 Furthermore, the Migration Agency noted that he had claimed that he had been threatened because he had shared Christian messages and criticism of the Taliban on social media, but had not submitted any written evidence in support of that. Thus, he had not established as probable that he was at risk on account of this.
42 As to his claim that he risked persecution on account of his Hazara ethnicity, the Migration Agency noted that he had submitted several news articles concerning the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan. However, those articles only concerned the general situation of Hazaras. They did not contain anything that could be connected to him personally. Moreover, there was no country information available to it which supported the contention that there was a general need for protection for Hazaras in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the applicant had not claimed to have been subjected to any particular ill-treatment on the basis of his ethnicity. He had therefore not established as probable that he risked treatment warranting protection owing to his Hazara ethnicity.
43 As to the risks the applicant claimed he would face in Afghanistan related to his having adopted Western values and a Western way of life, and also the risk that particular political opinions would be ascribed to him on that basis, the Migration Agency considered that there was no available country information to support the idea that every single person who had stayed outside of Afghanistan and been influenced by the Western world risked persecution upon return. Furthermore, there were no concrete circumstances which indicated that the applicant risked being subjected to persecution or treatment warranting protection owing to his stay in Sweden. Moreover, the fact that he, after a relatively long stay in Sweden, had adapted to a Western way of life, was not among the fundamental, immutable characteristics which a person could not be expected to conceal. It was incumbent on him, upon his return, to adapt to the customs and practices of his country of origin. He had therefore not established as probable that he risked being attributed a political opinion upon return.
44 Accordingly, the Migration Agency concluded that the applicant had not established as probable that he had a well-founded fear of persecution or that there would be a concrete and personal threat to him upon return to Afghanistan.
45 As to the general security situation in Afghanistan, the Migration Agency found that there was no indiscriminate violence of such a nature and extent in any province in Afghanistan that anyone, by their mere presence there, risked being exposed to treatment warranting protection. It held that the applicant could return to Afghanistan through the international airport in Kabul and from there make his way to Mazar-e Sharif. That route was considered to be safe.
46 In view of the above the Migration Agency concluded that the applicant was not a refugee or eligible for subsidiary protection. Moreover, the circumstances in his case were not considered to be exceptionally or particularly distressing within the meaning of Chapter 5, section 6, of the Aliens Act. In reaching the latter conclusion the Agency had regard, inter alia, to applicant’s state of health, his adaptation to Sweden and the situation in his home country, and found that even in a cumulative assessment he could not be granted a residence permit pursuant to that provision. Consequently, he was not entitled to a residence permit and his deportation was ordered.
The Migration Court
47 The applicant appealed against the Migration Agency’s decision. He reiterated his arguments and emphasised, among other things, the risks he faced as a Hazara. He referred in that connection to additional country information, including the EUAA’s Country Guidance: Afghanistan, January 2023. He also emphasised the genuineness of his conversion, that he had lived as an actively practising Christian for many years and that he faced risks as an apostate and someone who had turned his back on Islam. He stated, inter alia, that he was not a Muslim, that he had views on Islam which were considered heretical, that he had not performed any Muslim rituals for many years and lacked knowledge of Muslim prayers and practices, and that the Taliban were fanatical extremists who demanded things that had never been a part of his life. He also, in regard to his “westernisation”, submitted, among other things, that he had adapted to Swedish society, that he had a Swedish education in the care sector, that he spoke Dari with a slight Swedish accent, dressed in a Western style and was cleanshaven.
48 The applicant’s appeal was heard by the Stockholm Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen vid Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm), which held an oral hearing but refused the applicant’s request that it hear a pastor and members of his congregation as witnesses, instead permitting the applicant to submit written statements from them.
49 On 29 May 2023 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.
50 It, at the outset, found that the case had been investigated to the extent required, and that there were no deficiencies in the proceedings before the Migration Agency which warranted returning the case to it, as had been requested by the applicant. The court also agreed with the Migration Agency’s assessment regarding the applicant’s identity and place of origin. His case was therefore assessed based on the conditions in Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan. It further found that the general situation in Afghanistan and in the applicant’s home province was not so serious that it, in and of itself, conferred a right to a residence permit based on protection needs. Therefore, his individual grounds had to be assessed.
51 Regarding the applicant’s argument that he was in need of protection owing to a land dispute and his participation in a demonstration, the Migration Court found no reason to depart from the previous assessments. Thus, it concluded that he did not risk treatment warranting protection on those grounds.
52 As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, the court noted that that had been assessed previously and that the Luleå Migration Court at that time had found that the applicant had not established as probable that he had converted out of a genuine and personal religious conviction and that it had also not been established as probable that he risked being attributed Christian faith in Afghanistan. The court took note of the certificates and other documents that the applicant had submitted and stated that it did not doubt that he was baptised or that he was perceived as Christian by those who had written the certificates. However, that could not, on its own, establish as probable that his activities were based on a genuine and personal religious conviction. Having regard to the applicant’s statements at the oral hearing, the court found that his account of his conversion lacked personal considerations and deeper reflections. He had not been able to give a detailed account of his inner process of conversion and his description of Islam was so lacking in nuance that he appeared more to be critical of Afghan society than to have a genuine Christian conviction. His account of his Christian faith was also lacking in detail and of a general nature, and he had been unable to say when Pentecost falls. Considering that he claimed to have been active in the Pentecostal Church for seven years he could be expected to have acquired more knowledge and a deeper faith. Furthermore, he had stated that he could not live as a Christian in Afghanistan since there were no churches or congregations there. That indicated that his engagement in the Church was based on an appreciation of the community of the Church rather than a genuine Christian conviction. Having regard to the above, and the other facts of the case, the court concluded that the applicant had not established as probable that he had apostatised from Islam or converted to Christianity based on a personal and genuine conviction.
53 The court went on to assess whether he risked being attributed the status of an apostate or a Christian convert upon return to Afghanistan. It noted that he was born and raised in Afghanistan and that he had not established as probable that he had apostatised from Islam or converted to Christianity based on a personal and genuine conviction. It was therefore not reliably established that upon his return he would be unable to behave in accordance with Muslim customs or that he would express opinions about Islam which would be considered heretical. Nor were there any other concrete circumstances which would support the contention that upon his return he would be attributed the status of an apostate or a Christian convert. Thus, there was nothing to support the conclusion that he risked treatment warranting protection on those grounds. Moreover, there was no indication that he needed protection owing to his being, or being perceived to be, a Shia Muslim.
54 Regarding the applicant’s claim that he was in need of protection on the basis of his ethnicity and his Western views and adaptation to Swedish society, the Migration Court stated that, according to the available country information, neither Hazaras nor persons perceived as “westernised” generally risked being subjected to treatment warranting protection upon return to Afghanistan. It further found that the applicant had not shown that he personally risked treatment warranting protection on these grounds.
55 Lastly, the court agreed with the Migration Agency’s assessment that the circumstances of the case were not sufficient to be considered particularly or exceptionally distressing.
The Migration Court of Appeal
56 On 16 August 2023 the Migration Court of Appeal denied the applicant leave to appeal.
Subsequent proceedings
57 The applicant subsequently lodged an application with the Migration Agency, submitting that there were impediments to the enforcement of the deportation order. On 4 September 2023 the Migration Agency dismissed that application, essentially referring to the previous assessments and finding that there were no new circumstances which constituted impediments to enforcement or grounds for granting the applicant a re-examination.
58 On 3 November 2023, further to a request by the applicant, the Court applied Rule 39 of the Rules of Court until further notice. Accordingly, the Migration Agency decided to stay the enforcement of the deportation order.
59 The applicant subsequently submitted another application to the Migration Agency, referencing impediments to the enforcement of his deportation order. That application was dismissed.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
Relevant domestic law and practice
60 The basic provisions applicable in the present case, concerning the right of aliens to enter and remain in Sweden, are laid down in the Aliens Act (utlänningslagen, 2005:716).
61 An alien who is considered to be a refugee or a person eligible for subsidiary protection is, with certain exceptions, entitled to a residence permit in Sweden (Chapter 5, section 1, of the Act). The term “refugee” refers to an alien who is outside the country of his or her origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, nationality, religious or political beliefs, or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or other membership of a particular social group, and who is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (Chapter 4, section 1). The term “person eligible for subsidiary protection” refers to an alien who does not qualify as a refugee but is outside the country of his or her origin because there are substantial grounds for believing (grundad anledning att anta) that, upon return to his or her country of origin, the alien would be at risk of being punished by the death penalty or subjected to corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or as a civilian would face a serious and personal risk of being harmed by reason of indiscriminate violence in connection with an external or internal armed conflict, and who is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of origin. (Chapter 4, section 2). The above applies irrespective of whether the persecution or ill-treatment is at the hands of the authorities of the country or if those authorities cannot be expected to offer effective protection against such acts by private individuals.
62 Moreover, if a residence permit cannot be granted on any other grounds, a residence permit may be issued in cases where an overall assessment of the alien’s situation reveals such exceptionally distressing (synnerligen ömmande) circumstances that he or she should be allowed to stay in Sweden. In making this assessment, particular attention is to be paid to the alien’s state of health, his or her adaptation to Sweden and the situation in his or her country of origin (Chapter 5, section 6). Pursuant to the version of this provision which was in force during the applicant’s second set of asylum proceedings, it was sufficient that the circumstances were particularly distressing (särskilt ömmande) if the alien was a child or an adult who had resided in Sweden with a residence permit and during that time had developed special ties to Sweden.
63 As regards the enforcement of a deportation or expulsion order, according to a special provision on impediments to enforcement, an alien must not be sent to a country where there are reasonable grounds for believing (skälig anledning att anta) that he or she would be in danger of being punished by the death penalty or subjected to corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Chapter 12, section 1). In addition, an alien must not, in principle, be sent to a country where he or she risks persecution (Chapter 12, section 2).
64 Under certain conditions, an alien may be granted a residence permit even if a deportation or expulsion order has acquired legal force. This is the case when new circumstances have emerged which indicate (innebär) that there are impediments to enforcement of the nature referred to in Chapter 12, sections 1 or 2, or where there are medical or other special reasons why the order should not be enforced (Chapter 12, section 18). If a residence permit cannot be granted under those criteria, the Migration Agency may instead decide to re-examine the matter. Such re-examination is to be carried out where it may be assumed (kan antas), on the basis of new circumstances relied upon by the alien, that there are lasting impediments to enforcement of the nature referred to in Chapter 12, sections 1 and 2, and that these circumstances could not have been raised previously or the alien shows that he or she has a valid excuse for not having done so. Should the applicable conditions not have been met, the Migration Agency will decide not to grant re-examination (Chapter 12, section 19).
65 As to the standard of proof in cases concerning requests for asylum, the Migration Court of Appeal has stated that when invoking refugee status or other grounds for protection, the asylum seeker must establish as probable (göra sannolikt) that they are in need of international protection. That includes establishing as probable their identity, including their name, age and nationality. However, the Migration Court of Appeal has also stated that the standard of proof cannot be set too high when it comes to claims of risk of persecution, as it is rarely possible to provide complete evidence that clearly demonstrates that such a risk exists. To the extent that the evidence is insufficient, the applicant’s account must therefore be accepted if it appears credible and probable. In this context, the Migration Court of Appeal has also referred to the principle of the “benefit of the doubt” as set out in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (see, for example, the Migration Court of Appeal’s judgments in MIG 2007:12; MIG 2007:37; MIG 2010:6; MIG 2011:8; and MIG 2014:1).
Relevant European Union law and case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
66 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9 (“the Qualification Directive”), applicable at the relevant time, regulates refugee status within the European Union legal order and makes provision for granting subsidiary protection status.
67 Article 2(d) defines a refugee as a third-country national or a stateless person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside his or her country of origin and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.
68 Article 2(f) defines a person eligible for subsidiary protection as a third-country national or a stateless person in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to his or her country of origin and who is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.
69 Article 15 of the Qualification Directive defines “serious harm” as consisting of:
“(a) death penalty or execution; or
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.”
70 The Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU”) has ruled on several cases relating to the interpretation of the Qualification Directive, including the following which are of particular interest in the present case.
71 In its judgment of 5 September 2012 in Y and Z, C-71/11 and C-99/11, EU:C:2012:518, paragraph 80, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU stated that an applicant’s fear of being persecuted was well-founded if, in the light of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the competent authorities considered that it may reasonably be thought that, upon return to his or her country of origin, he or she would engage in religious practices which would expose him or her to a real risk of persecution. In assessing an application for refugee status on an individual basis, those authorities could not reasonably expect the applicant to abstain from those religious practices.
72 In its judgment of 21 September 2023 in Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Political opinions in the host Member State) C-151/22, EU:C:2023:688, paragraphs 29-37, the CJEU held, inter alia, that the concept of “political opinion” and “political characteristic” was to be interpreted broadly and that in order to fall within the concept of “political opinion” or “political characteristic” it was not required that the views, ideas or beliefs which the applicant claimed to have or express must be of a certain degree of conviction for that applicant. It was sufficient for that applicant to claim that he or she had or expressed those opinions, thoughts or beliefs. Moreover, the CJEU found that while the degree of conviction of the political opinions relied on by the applicant and whether he or she engaged in activities to promote those opinions were relevant factors for the purposes of assessing whether an applicant’s fear of persecution on account of his or her political opinions was well founded, it was not required that those political opinions be so deeply rooted in the applicant that he or she could not refrain, if returned to his or her country of origin, from manifesting them (ibid., paragraphs 46-49).
73 In its judgment of 11 June 2024 in Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Women identifying with the value of gender equality), C-646/21, EU:C:2024:487, paragraph 64, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU held that depending on the circumstances in the country of origin, women who are nationals of that country, who share as a common characteristic the fact that they genuinely come to identify with the fundamental value of equality between women and men during their stay in a member State may be regarded as belonging to “a particular social group”, constituting a “reason for persecution” capable of leading to the recognition of refugee status. The CJEU also stated that the fact that they could avoid the risk of being persecuted in their country of origin on account of that identification by exercising restraint in expressing it was not to be taken into account (ibid., paragraph 63).
74 In its judgment of 4 October 2024 in Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl and Others (Afghan women), C-608/22 and C-609/22, EU:C:2024:828, the CJEU found that the accumulation of discriminatory measures adopted in respect of women by the Taliban regime constituted acts of persecution and that EU member States could recognise Afghan women as refugees merely based on their gender and nationality without having to take into consideration further personal circumstances and characteristics.
Relevant decisions from the United Nations Committee against Torture and the United Nations Human Rights Committee
75 The United Nations Committee against Torture (“the CAT”) has dealt with complaints concerning deportations to Afghanistan, for example in four decisions issued after the Taliban takeover in August 2021 concerning deportations from Sweden (A.A. v. Sweden, Communication No. 918/2019 (2022), UN Doc. CAT/C/72/D/918/2019 (2022); O.R. v. Sweden, Communication No. 1016/2020 (2023), UN Doc. CAT/C/77/D/1016/2020 (2023); N.R. v. Sweden, Communication No. 1047/2021 (2023), UN Doc. CAT/C/78/D/1047/2021 (2023); and A.A.S. et al. v. Sweden, Communication No. 937/2019 (2024), UN Doc. CAT/C/78/D/937/2019 (2024)). In those decisions, which all concerned Afghan nationals who claimed, inter alia, to have converted to Christianity and some of whom were of Hazara ethnicity, the CAT concluded that it would be inconsistent with the obligations of the State Party under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the Convention against Torture”) if it were to remove the complainants to Afghanistan on the basis of the existing decisions by its asylum authorities (contrast M.T. v. Sweden, Communication No. 997/2020 (2024), UN doc. CAT/C/81/D/997/2020 (2024), in which the opposite conclusion was reached). The CAT’s decisions were based on the individual circumstances of those cases and in some of them the CAT found that the complainants’ claims had been insufficiently examined by the domestic authorities (see, in particular, A.A. v. Sweden, paragraphs 8.8-8.15 and 9; O.R. v. Sweden, paragraph 10.6; and N.R. v. Sweden, paragraphs 7.5 and 7.6). The CAT also noted that there was a need to consider the general human rights situation in Afghanistan, which had significantly changed since the takeover of the country by the Taliban (see N.R. v. Sweden, paragraph 7.7, and A.A.S. et al. v. Sweden, paragraph 8.5; see also O.R. v. Sweden, paragraph 10.10).
76 During the same period, namely after the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the UN Human Rights Committee (CCPR), declared inadmissible a communication concerning the deportation from Sweden to Afghanistan of a Hazara man who, inter alia, claimed to have converted to Christianity, as the author was considered to have failed to substantiate his claims. In the decision the CCPR referred, in particular, to the conclusions of the domestic authorities (M.L.A. v. Sweden, Communication No. 3216/2018, UN Doc. CCPR/C/135/D/3216/2018 (2023)).
Relevant Country Information on Afghanistan
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
77 Relevant parts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Guidance Note on the International Protection Needs of People Fleeing Afghanistan (Update II), of September 2025, read as follows (footnotes omitted):
“Introduction
...
2. Civilians in Afghanistan continue to be gravely impacted by a deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in the country. In addition, the security situation continues to be fluid; the Taliban de facto authorities face armed resistance from the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) as well as several armed groups across the country. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 August 2025, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) documented 1,535 incidents of battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians causing an estimated 1,827 civilian and non-civilian fatalities, with most of the incidents occurring in Kabul (347), Takhar (125) and Herat (119) Provinces. Civilian casualties are mostly caused by the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks, which are mostly carried out by ISKP and target either the de facto authorities or Afghanistan’s Shia minority.
Human Rights Situation
3. The de facto authorities are reported to have committed serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, perpetrated in the context of public punishments, in targeting persons associated with the former government and in enforcing harsh public morality laws and decrees. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the ‘human rights situation in Afghanistan remains very serious, as severe economic impacts and humanitarian needs have pushed the population into deeper poverty and precarity, women and girls have faced ever tighter restrictions, civic space and media freedom has been severely curtailed, and the rule of law and institutional protection of human rights continue to fall well short of international norms.’
4. Since 2021, the de facto authorities have promulgated a series of edicts and decrees that severely curtail women’s rights ... Most of these restrictions were codified by the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (‘PVPV’) law published by the de facto authorities on 21 August, 2024. In addition, the de facto authorities have targeted persons perceived as opposing or criticizing their rule, including journalists, human rights defenders, civil society activists, academics, writers and artists, former government officials and their families. Ethnic and religious minorities are not represented in the de facto authorities and experience violence, discrimination, harassment, arrest and exclusion. ...
5. The de facto authorities have imposed severe restrictions on the media ... leading to an information environment where people inside and outside of Afghanistan have insufficient information about events occurring inside the country. ... The de facto authorities’ repression of civic space and tight control of the media environment makes it difficult to document, verify or report human rights violations. ...
...
International Protection Needs
...
Constraints on Assessing International Protection Needs
11. Despite adopting some laws, the de facto authorities continue to govern in large part by decree ... This governance is characterized by uncertainty, arbitrariness and disregard for the rule of law. As of March 2025, the status of laws passed by the prior government remains unclear, while the de facto authorities have gradually imposed repressive policies curtailing rights and implemented public corporal punishments such as floggings, amputations and executions.
...
13. Reports indicate that enforcement of edicts, decrees and even the PVPV law can differ by geographic area, local leadership and verbal negotiation with the de facto authorities. However, UNAMA has noted that the de facto authorities clearly intend for the PVPV law to be applied nationwide, and has put in place a ‘robust enforcement framework’, including through provincial committees and the increased presence of [Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (‘MPVPV’)] inspectors. Generally, the Taliban monitors compliance across the country, including by using sophisticated surveillance techniques and technologies.
14. The lack of a clear and transparent process for providing edicts, decrees or laws, combined with enforcement of harsh punishments for transgressions, contribute to uncertainty for the population of Afghanistan about what behaviour is, or will be shortly, prohibited. ...
...
16. Given the obstacles to information gathering and reporting in Afghanistan, it will frequently be the case that human rights violations and abuses remain undocumented and unreported. UNHCR calls on decision-makers to give due weight to the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in the modalities adopted by the de facto authorities for issuing decrees, coupled with the ongoing uncertainties regarding the applicability of Afghanistan’s previous legal framework and a lack of complete country of origin information. Decision-makers must not draw adverse inferences from a lack of information, given constraints on the ability of human rights and humanitarian organizations and the media in Afghanistan to perform their functions unimpeded.
Risk Profiles
17. Based on available reports about widespread human rights violations in Afghanistan, including accounts provided to UNHCR by Afghans in flight and those already abroad as part of UNHCR monitoring activities, many Afghans will have international protection needs. The list of profiles identified below does not presume to be an exhaustive enumeration of all profiles of Afghans who may have a well-founded fear of persecution. ...
...
Women and girls
...
19. ... the de facto authorities passed the PVPV Law in August 2024, which formalized many of the decrees and edicts which had been promulgated through other channels since 2021 and strengthened its implementation of strict behaviour laws. Nevertheless, the de facto authorities have continued to add further restrictions via social media or verbal instructions. Agents of the de facto ... MPVPV ... carry out punishments and use force against persons whom they perceive to have violated their restrictions, including through ‘the use of threats, arbitrary arrests and detentions [and] excessive use of force’. In August 2024, the de facto authorities announced that the MPVPV had detained 13,000 persons since August 2023 for ‘violating their morality rules’. There are reports that MPVPV enforcers interpret the law broadly, implementing stricter requirements than contained in the PVPV law.
20. The Taliban reportedly uses informers in communities to identify non-compliance, which can erode social cohesion and creates a climate of fear and self-regulation. The expectation by the de facto authorities that communities and families enforce restrictions on women and girls is reportedly ‘reshaping social and familial dynamics’. Criticism of the law, and any other law propagated by the de facto authorities, is, according to the de facto authorities, comparable to criticism of Sharia law, and therefore not permissible.
21. Since the publication of the PVPV law, there has been an increase in enforcement and the presence of MPVPV enforcers. ...
...
23. ... In light of the wide range of increasingly restrictive measures imposed by the de facto authorities on women and girls in Afghanistan in violation of their human rights, UNHCR considers that Afghan women and girls are likely to be in need of international refugee protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
...
Persons (perceived as) opposing or criticizing the de facto authorities
31. The de facto authorities have targeted persons who they perceive as having opposed or criticizing their rule, their edicts, decrees or laws ...
32. Generally, the de facto authorities have restricted freedom of expression and punished those who criticize the de facto authorities or their governance. ... The de facto authorities reportedly monitor social media activity and have ‘routinely’ searched through individuals’ mobile phones for critical comments. ...
33. ... persons who are (perceived as) criticizing or opposing the de facto authorities are likely to be in need of international protection.
Members of minority religious groups and members of minority ethnic groups
34. Religious minorities in Afghanistan, including notably non-Sunni Muslims, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus and Sikhs, as well as agnostics and atheists, are increasingly marginalized, with the courts, the government and the education system all aligned with a specific interpretation of Islam and with the de facto authorities imposing severe limitations on other religious practices. Many persons from religious minorities reportedly live in hiding or in fear. Individuals have been beaten and harassed for non-conforming religious practices, primarily Muslims who are from other sects, such as Salafis, Shias, Ismailis and Sufis. Shias have reportedly faced restrictions, physical violence, harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention for publicly displaying religious symbols and for celebrating a yearly festival. Reportedly, the de facto authorities have forced Ismailis to convert to Sunni Islam in Badakhshan province.
35. Ethnic minorities, which include Hazaras, Tajiks, Turkmen, Balochs and Uzbeks, remain underrepresented at all levels of government and allege that the de facto authorities discriminate against them by restricting or unfairly distributing aid and public services. The de facto authorities have reportedly sided with Pashtun groups in land disputes, including by forcibly evicting ethnic minority residents including Hazaras, and targeted minority neighbourhoods in Kabul for demolition. According to experts interviewed by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Hazaras face discrimination and mistreatment from other ethnic groups and often from local de facto officials.
36. Shia Muslims who are Hazara have been targeted in ‘widespread and systematic’ attacks by ISKP, with repeated attacks on mosques and in the Hazara neighbourhood of Dasht-e-Barchi in Kabul, causing hundreds of casualties. ...
37. Ethnic and religious minorities in Afghanistan face serious violations of their human rights by the de facto authorities and by non-State actors, combined with historic discrimination and an increasingly hostile social and political environment. As such, persons from some religious and ethnic minorities, particularly non-Muslims (including Christians, Bahai, Sikhs and Hindus), Shias and Muslim minorities targeted for non-Sunni practices (including Ahmadis and Ismaelis), are likely to be in need of international protection. Other persons of this profile may have international protection needs depending on the individual circumstances of the case.
...
Availability of Protection
42. In light of the available information about widespread human rights violations committed by the de facto authorities, and in the absence of an independent judiciary or court system, UNHCR does not consider that the de facto authorities are willing or able to provide protection to Afghans at risk of persecution, including societal forms of persecution at the hands of family members and other members of the community.
Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative
43. In view of the volatility of the situation throughout Afghanistan, coupled with the grave economic and humanitarian situation in the country, UNHCR does not consider it appropriate to deny international protection to nationals and former habitual residents of Afghanistan on the basis of an internal flight or relocation alternative.
...
Returns to Afghanistan
...
51. Refugees and people who have not yet had the opportunity to have their refugee status determined, should not be forcibly returned, in line with States’ non-refoulement obligations. The situation in Afghanistan continues to be volatile and may remain uncertain for some time to come, creating significant challenges for the safe and dignified return of those determined not to be in need of international protection. Against that background, UNHCR calls on States to exercise caution when considering forced returns to Afghanistan of those determined not to be in need of international protection, taking into account the sustained and large-scale humanitarian crisis in the country and the potentially destabilizing impact of large-scale returns on the fragile situation in Afghanistan.”
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
78 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”) published a number of reports, including quarterly updates on the human rights situation in Afghanistan. During the period from January 2024 to June 2025 those reports regularly described, inter alia, attacks against civilians, targeting Shia Muslims and Hazaras among others; judicial corporal punishment and executions implemented by the de facto authorities; and measures taken by the de facto authorities to implement the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (also referred to as the Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the PVPV Law or the Morality Law), for example detention or ill-treatment of individuals for failing to attend prayers at mosques, arrests of men who shaved their beards shorter than fist length and arrests for posting “inappropriate” content on social media. In a press statement from March 2026 UNAMA further warned of increasing civilian casualties and a worsening of the humanitarian situation due to cross-border clashes between Afghan de facto security forces and Pakistani security forces.
79 UNAMA also published the report De Facto Authorities’ Moral Oversight in Afghanistan: Impacts on Human Rights, of July 2024, which included, inter alia, the following information (footnotes omitted):
“Since its establishment, the activities of the de facto MPVPV [Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice] have already had negative impacts on the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in various aspects of life for people living in Afghanistan, with a discriminatory and disproportionate impact on women. The de facto MPVPV has issued instructions on obligations and prohibitions based on the de facto authorities’ interpretation of Islamic law. The instructions are issued in a variety of formats and often only verbally, and in certain cases lack clarity, consistency and legal certainty. Failure to adhere to any of these instructions could at times lead to severe punishments. The ambiguities and inconsistencies surrounding the instructions issued, the unpredictability, severity and disproportionality of punishments associated with non-compliance, and restrictive measures to regulate activities of individuals in the private sphere all contribute to a climate of fear and intimidation among segments of people living in Afghanistan.
...
Men have also been instructed to observe congregational prayers. In addition, instances were recorded where individuals were victims of ill-treatment by de facto DPVPVs [provincial Departments for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice] because they followed beliefs other than those prescribed by the de facto authorities, impeding a person’s freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
The de facto MPVPV reportedly has a broad mandate and various enforcement methods have been used, including verbal intimidation, arrests and detentions, ill- treatment and public lashing. People’s right to privacy is violated through searches for prohibited items in their phone or cars, having their attendance at mosques recorded, or being required to show proof of family relationship in public places. ...”
80 UNAMA furthermore published the Report on the Implementation, Enforcement and Impact of the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Afghanistan, of April 2025, which set out, inter alia, the following in its executive summary:
“Six months into implementation of the PVPV law, UNAMA observed a determination by Afghanistan’s de facto authorities to ensure their vision of a pure Islamic system is implemented nationwide. The de facto authorities have stated they view the PVPV law as a component of measures aimed at reshaping Afghan society in line with their vision by creating a culture of self-perpetuating social and individual conduct and values they assert will result in a nationwide return to a pure Islamic system in Afghanistan.
The PVPV law codifies many of the de facto authorities’ existing directives and restrictions issued as decrees, edicts and instructions, broadening some and adding new ones. These include a requirement for women to wear a hijab (with face covering) outside of the home; for men to have a physical appearance considered Islamic and to attend congregational prayers; prohibition of certain celebrations, items and activities deemed un-Islamic; prohibition of unrelated men and women from looking at each other requiring the separation of men and women; drivers prohibited from transporting women unaccompanied by a mahram (male guardian) with women banned from using public transport without a mahram; and ensuring publications and media content do not contradict Sharia, insult Muslims or contain images of living beings.
The PVPV law articulates a robust enforcement framework. ...
Increased nationwide enforcement of the PVPV law was evident within weeks of the law’s promulgation ... UNAMA observed an initial wave of advocacy efforts by the de facto authorities, with a particular focus on northern provinces where greater resistance may have been expected for social, cultural, and religious reasons. Three key themes were conveyed through this advocacy: that all Afghans have an obligation to obey the Taliban leader; that the de facto authorities would not bow to any internal or external pressure in their pursuit of their version of Sharia; and that Afghanistan is the only nation in the world living under pure Sharia.
Across Afghanistan, men, women, minorities, and youth have been impacted to varying degrees by enforcement of the PVPV law often marked by violations of personal and private spaces, public areas, economic activities, and, in the case of non-Sunnis, religious spaces. Thousands of predominately male PVPV inspectors are conducting enforcement operations, equipped with broad discretionary powers, including of arbitrary detention and confiscation.
...
Enforcement of the PVPV law has also affected men facing stipulations on hairstyle and beard length, attendance at prayers and from other provisions of the law. UNAMA observed that in the first six months of implementation of the PVPV law, over half of the PVPV law-related arbitrary detentions concerned men’s appearance ...”
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan
81 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan issued several reports of the situation for human rights in Afghanistan. In the first such report, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, 9 September 2022 (UN Doc. A/HRC/51/6), the Special Rapporteur expressed concern about a number of aspects of the human rights situation in Afghanistan, and noted, inter alia, the following about the situation for Hazaras:
“64. The Special Rapporteur is seriously concerned about the situation of minorities since August 2021. Their places of worship and educational and medical centres have been systematically attacked and their members have been arbitrary arrested, tortured, summarily executed, evicted, marginalized and, in some cases, forced to flee the country.
65. Hazaras, who are overwhelmingly Shia, are historically one of the most severely persecuted groups in Afghanistan. They are subjected to multiple forms of discrimination, affecting a broad spectrum of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. The Taliban have appointed Pashtuns to senior positions in government structures in Hazara-dominated provinces, forcibly evicted Hazaras from their homes without adequate prior notice and imposed religious taxation contrary to Shia principles. There are reports of arbitrary arrests, torture and other ill-treatment, summary executions and enforced disappearances. There are also reports of an increase in inflammatory speech, both online and in some mosques during Friday prayers, including calls for Hazaras to be killed. ...
66. In May, the Special Rapporteur visited the Se Dokan Mosque in Mazar-e Sharif and the Sayed ul Shuhada and Abdul Rahman Shahid schools in Dasht-e Barchi, Kabul, all of which were attacked by ISIS-KP in 2021 and 2022. ...
67. These attacks, frequently claimed by ISIL-K, and the historical persecution of Hazaras and other minorities noted above, appear to be systematic in nature and reflect elements of an organizational policy, thus bearing hallmarks of international crimes, including crimes against humanity. ...”
82 In a later report, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, 20 February 2025 (UN Doc. A/HRC/58/80), which mainly covered the period between 1 August and 31 December 2024 and built on previous reports, the Special Rapporteur provided a general overview of the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, noting that the human rights crisis had deepened continuously since August 2021, when the Taliban seized power. That report included, inter alia, the following information (footnotes omitted):
B. Civic space
24. The Taliban severely restrict freedom of expression, tolerating no opposition, dissent or even contrary views. They have clamped down on civic space through widespread censorship, threats and intimidation, violence, arbitrary arrests and the closure of institutions. ...
...
26. Afghans have warned of the Taliban’s extensive use of digital and in-person surveillance, using informants to monitor dissent, including on social media. ... Many have reported that they take digital protection measures, noting that the Taliban might search mobile phones at checkpoints. The situation has created a climate of fear within communities and led to self-policing. ...
...
28. The Special Rapporteur, [UNAMA], other human rights mechanisms and media institutions have documented widespread arbitrary arrest, violence, torture and ill-treatment of journalists, activists and defenders. ...
...
C. Minorities
44. Afghanistan is home to a diversity of ethnic, religious and linguistic communities ... The Taliban have emphasized unity, stability and ‘equal rights in the Islamic system’. However, a wide range of Afghan stakeholders have shared with the Special Rapporteur growing concerns about unaddressed grievances along ethnic and religious lines related to discrimination, exclusion, violence and the lack of protection, as well as lack of recognition of past violations. The de facto authorities frequently seem unwilling to acknowledge or address such grievances. ...
45. ... The lack of representation of minorities in de facto institutions has resulted in credible allegations of marginalization, including regarding the distribution of humanitarian aid, social security, judicial decisions, media coverage, civil service employment, and government policies. ...
...
49. During the reporting period, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan continued to claim attacks deliberately targeting members of religious minorities, especially Shia Muslims – who are predominantly ethnic Hazaras – and Sufis. ...
...
51. The Special Rapporteur reiterates that the series of attacks by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan targeting specific religious groups, with Hazaras bearing the brunt of such attacks, have the hallmarks of international crimes. ...
...
V. Civil and political rights
A. Right to life and security of the person, extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment
82. In the second half of 2024, the Taliban continued to accelerate the imposition of corporal punishments that amount to torture and other ill-treatment. Between July and December 2024, at least 311 persons (264 men and 47 women) received corporal punishments, according to announcements made by the de facto Supreme Court. ...
83. On 13 November, the de facto authorities carried out its sixth public execution ...
84. In addition to de facto court-sanctioned corporal and capital punishments, the Special Rapporteur remains concerned about torture and ill-treatment occurring in detention centres, including unofficial places of detention ...
...
B. Rule of law and administration of justice
86. The Special Rapporteur continues to be concerned about the lack of legal certainty, arbitrary actions during enforcement and the right to a fair trial without discrimination, with vulnerable groups, such as women, children and minorities, especially affected.
...
88. The de facto authorities are given broad discretion and disproportionate power to implement and enforce edicts with little or no oversight. For example, under the law on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice, muhtasibs have been provided with wide discretionary powers, without the necessary checks and balances to ensure accountability and keep abuse of power in check.
89. The Special Rapporteur has also received information that punishments and other actions are being carried out by Taliban members, without due process or contrary to established legal procedures. ...
...
VI. Economic, social and cultural rights
...
C. Housing, land and property rights
105. Afghans from around the country, especially those belonging to minority groups, have increasingly raised concerns with the Special Rapporteur about cases of land disputes ... leading to forced evictions and displacement, as well as loss of livelihoods ...”
83 The Special Rapporteur furthermore prepared the report Study on the so-called law on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice - Advance unedited version, 12 March 2025 (UN Doc. A/HRC/58/74). That report noted, inter alia, that the “law codifies and consolidates the many discriminatory decrees, edicts and policies imposed by the Taliban since seizing power in 2021. While women and girls bear the brunt of this oppression, no one is spared: men, boys, gender-diverse persons, ethnic and religious minorities, marginalized communities and the independent media all face a deeply repressive regime that dictates almost every aspect of life.”
84 As to the specific restrictions imposed by the Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice the report noted, inter alia, that the Law not only imposes strict dress codes on women and girls but also imposes restrictions on the appearance of men and boys that encompass both clothing and the length of their beards. Other provisions place further restrictions on people’s personal appearance, such as the banning of neckties, crucifixes and other undefined “un-Islamic” symbols.
85 The report further provided the following regarding restrictions related to religious beliefs and practices (footnotes omitted):
“61. Multiple provisions of the law restrict the right to freedom of religion or belief. These restrictions take several forms, such as by: imposing the Taliban’s ideology, including their religious views, on the population, irrespective of people’s personal religious or other beliefs, or lack thereof; mandating specific religious practices for Muslims; prohibiting the practice of religious or belief systems other than Islam; and granting broad powers to restrict Muslim practices and beliefs deemed contrary to the Taliban’s interpretation of sharia.
...
63. The religious practices of Muslims are strictly regulated. In addition to ... dress codes, the law mandates congregational prayers in mosques at set times ... Even before the law was introduced, the Taliban had instructed that congregational prayers must be observed and that those who failed to comply would be subjected to detention and corporal punishments. Since the law was enacted, Afghans have continued to report inspections to ensure that businesses are closed during prayer times and the recording of attendance at prayers.
...
65. Under the law, actions or behaviour that the Taliban deem ‘un-Islamic’ can result in punishment. These actions include publishing content deemed to contradict sharia or Islamic principles ... celebrating festivals with no basis in Islam ... wearing or promoting ‘un-Islamic’ symbols ... and practising or promoting bid’ah ... While these provisions affect all persons in Afghanistan, the broad discretion to determine what constitutes ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour or content, coupled with the Taliban’s narrow interpretation of sharia on the basis of Hanafi jurisprudence, exacerbates concerns about the discriminatory application of the law against Muslim minorities, in particular Shia Muslims, who follow their own schools of thought and who have long faced discrimination and persecution in Afghanistan.”
86 The report also described other restrictions imposed by the Law, for example restrictions on the freedom of movement of women and girls, restrictions on the interaction of unmarried women and men, including in their day-to-day activities – for example prohibiting women and men who are not related from looking at each other’s bodies or faces – as well as prohibitions on being friends with or helping non-Muslims, prohibitions on the “wrongful” use of tape recorders or radio and taking pictures or videos of living beings, restrictions on cultural events and celebrations and prohibitions on the playing of music.
87 As to the enforcement of the Law, the report stated inter alia, the following:
“75. The law on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice grants muhtasibs broad and arbitrary powers to detain and punish individuals accused of infractions of its provisions, without any requirement for evidence or due process, in flagrant violation of international human rights law and standards. In conferring such broad and discretionary powers, the law enables muhtasibs to simultaneously function as law enforcement officers, judges and prison wardens, which very few limitations or checks on their power.
...
78. Since the law was enacted, there have been multiple reports not only of its enforcement but also of the strict enforcement of other Taliban restrictions ... Afghans have described an increased presence of muhtasibs on the streets, inspecting people for compliance at markets and on public transport and meting out punishments ... Across different provinces, there are consistent reports of muhtasibs checking people’s phones for banned content and entering people’s homes to conduct searches. While enforcement has been patchy, the overall trend is towards conformity.
80. While enforcement is being felt across the country, marginalized communities with pre-existing vulnerabilities, including widows, female-headed households and internally displaced persons, are disproportionately affected. Meanwhile, there are troubling indications that the law is being implemented more strictly in areas home to ethnic and religious minorities, particularly in central, northern, north-eastern and western Afghanistan.
81. Another worrying trend is the increasing involvement of community leaders, religious leaders and family members in enforcement. ...
82. While the extent of community enforcement varies across the country, the overall trend points to a growing normalization of restrictions and a blurring of the lines between Taliban control and private and community pressure.”
88 When assessing the impacts and implications of the Law the Special Rapporteur noted, inter alia, the following (footnotes omitted):
“92. The Taliban’s oppressive policies, including the law on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice, not only allow the de facto authorities to exert control over nearly every aspect of Afghans’ daily lives, they reinforce a pervasive climate of fear that the Special Rapporteur has noted with concern since his initial report in September 2022. Public spaces, homes and even personal interactions are monitored, eroding the distinction between private and public life. Non-compliance can result in harsh punishments, including public shaming, imprisonment or physical violence. This, in turn, fosters an atmosphere of anxiety, as individuals live in constant fear of violating the Taliban’s moral code.
93. Equally worrying is the growing fear of being reported by neighbours, colleagues or even family members for real or perceived infractions of Taliban policies. ...”
European Union Agency for Asylum
Country Guidance: Afghanistan, May 2024
89 The European Union Agency for Asylum’s (EUAA) Country Guidance: Afghanistan, May 2024, which superseded the Country Guidance of January 2023 and was primarily based on information concerning the period from 1 July 2022 to 31 January 2024, stated, inter alia, the following regarding the general developments in Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover in 2021:
“Since the Taliban takeover, several armed groups, including the NRF [the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan], have been resisting the Taliban by force. In addition, the ISKP [the Islamic State Khorasan Province] remains active in Afghanistan, carrying out attacks against both Taliban and civilian targets ... Nevertheless, the levels of armed violence significantly dropped following the Taliban takeover in 2021 compared to the previous years of conflict ...
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The Taliban have announced their intention to govern through ‘a strong Islamic government’, based on their principles, religion, and culture. Their interim government has been ‘modelled on the same system’ as in the 1990s ... with a decision-making structure that can be described as a religious theocracy. The Taliban have further stated that ‘nothing should be against Islamic values’ under their rule and have issued numerous instructions calling on people to observe Islamic law (sharia). ... The human rights situation has gradually deteriorated, and sources have described Afghanistan as developing into a theocratic police state, which is ruled through an atmosphere of fear and abuse ...”
90 The Country Guidance further noted that “[i]n Afghanistan, a wide range of different groups and individuals can be considered as actors of persecution or serious harm, and a clear distinction between State and non-State actors ... may be difficult to make.” One of the actors mentioned specifically is the Islamic State Khorasan Province (“the ISKP”), and, inter alia, the following was noted regarding that organisation:
“ISKP’s activity has traditionally been concentrated in Kabul and in the country’s eastern provinces, notably Kunar and Nangarhar where the group used to have a strong foothold, especially in rural areas. Although attacks have been recorded beyond these core areas (such as suicide attacks against Shia mosques in Kunduz, Kandahar and Mazar-e Sharif), most security events involving ISKP continued to be recorded in Kabul, Kunar, and Nangarhar ...
Primary targets of ISKP have been Taliban fighters, Taliban officials and religious leaders, in its strive to undermine the Taliban rule. However, the deadliest attacks attributed to or claimed by ISKP have been against certain ethno-religious groups, in particular the Shia Hazara community. ...”
91 As to the potential international protection needs of particular profiles of asylum seekers, the report stated, inter alia, the following:
“3.11. Individuals considered to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy
This profile covers persons who are considered to have abandoned or renounced the religious belief or principles of Islam (apostasy), as well as persons considered to have spoken sacrilegiously about God or sacred things (blasphemy). It includes individuals who have converted to a new faith, based on their genuine inner belief (e.g. converts to Christianity), as well as those who disbelieve or lack belief in the existence of God (atheists).
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Apostasy is a crime defined by sharia and includes conversion to another religion ... According to the Taliban’s interpretation of sharia, apostasy is punishable by death ... It is reported that there has not been any formal Taliban policy on hunting down converts, as there is a general expectation that converts are killed by their own families ...
The Taliban see those individuals who preach against them or contravene their interpretations of Islam as ‘apostates’ ... According to the ISKP, Muslim allies of the West, but also those individuals who practice forms of ‘impure’ Islam, which includes non-Sunnis ... can be defined as ‘apostates’ ...
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Individuals who hold views that can be perceived as having fallen away from Islam, such as converts, atheists and secularists, cannot express their views or relationship to Islam openly, at the risk of sanctions or violence, including by their family. Such individuals must also appear outwardly Muslim and fulfil the behavioural religious and cultural expectations of their local environment ...
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What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?
For individuals considered to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including converts, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.
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3.12. Individuals perceived to have transgressed religious, moral and/or societal norms
This profile refers to individuals whose actions, behaviours, or practices are seen as transgressing religious, moral and/or societal norms, irrespective of whether the perceived transgression of norms occurred in Afghanistan or abroad. ...
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Afghanistan’s highly diverse society includes urban, rural, and tribal segments ... Islamic values, concepts, and practices influence many social and behavioural norms throughout society. ... Transgression of a moral and/or societal norm may lead to honour-based violence ...
The Taliban’s view of sharia is based on the Sunni Hanafi school of jurisprudence, but it is also influenced by local traditions and tribal codes. ... After the takeover, the Taliban announced that they intended to act on the basis of their principles, religion and culture, and emphasised the importance of Islam and that ‘nothing should be against Islamic values’. Reportedly, initially after the takeover, there was a tendency among Taliban judges not to issue ‘too harsh’ punishments. However, on 14 November 2022 the Taliban supreme leader ordered all judges to fully implement the sharia, including hudud and qisas punishments that comprise execution, stoning, flogging and amputation. ...
The Taliban also re-established the MPVPV which has increased the enforcement of a wide range of directives related to extramarital relationships, dress code, attendance at prayers, and music. ...
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The Taliban took restrictive measures regarding the dress code of Afghan men and women. ... Sources reported ad hoc beatings and lashings carried out by, among others, members of the Taliban MPVPV and the de facto police against persons not conforming with issued instruction on social and dress codes ...
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... cases were reported in which men were stopped and harassed by Taliban fighters for wearing Western style clothes or shaving beards. ...
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Moreover, in April 2022, seven men were flogged and sentenced to imprisonment by the Taliban Supreme Court, inter alia for drinking alcohol. Cases of lashing for consuming alcohol and for drug trafficking were also reported ...
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... Afghan media also reported on cases where the Taliban had detained, beaten, and killed individuals for playing music. ...
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What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?
For individuals perceived to have committed zina [illicit sexual relations, adultery, pre-marital sex] well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.
For other individuals perceived to have transgressed moral and/or societal norms in Afghanistan or abroad, the individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: gender (the risk is higher for women), profession (especially artists, barbers, persons working in beauty salons), area of origin and conservative environment, visibility of the applicant and the transgression (also when the transgression took place abroad), etc.
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3.13. Individuals (perceived as) influenced by foreign values (also commonly referred to as ‘Westernised’)
This profile refers to persons who may be (perceived as) influenced by foreign values (also commonly referred to as ‘Westernised’) due, for example, to their activities, behaviour, appearance and expressed opinions, which may be seen as non-Afghan or non-Muslim. It may also include those who return to Afghanistan after having spent time in Western countries.
This profile may largely overlap with the profile 3.12. Individuals perceived to have transgressed religious, moral and/or societal norms ...
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The Taliban’s views on persons leaving Afghanistan for Western countries remain ambiguous. On the one hand, the Taliban have said that people flee due to poverty and that it has nothing to do with any fear of them, adding that they were attracted by the economically better life in the West. Another narrative about persons leaving Afghanistan has been about the elites that left. They were not seen as ‘Afghans’, but as corrupt ‘puppets’ of the ‘occupation’, who lacked ‘roots’ in Afghanistan. ...
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Taliban officials have repeatedly called on Afghans to return to Afghanistan. They have also communicated that former officials returning from abroad will be ensured safety ... There have been reports about Afghans returning voluntarily to Afghanistan, to relocate there, for business, to visit family, and to go on holiday – including from Europe and the US ...
It is reported that the Taliban have minimal background information on returning individuals and a source described the Taliban’s approach towards returnees as ‘lenient’. However, a human rights activist stated that high-profile individuals might face problems if they would return. An anonymous organisation with presence in Afghanistan stated that sometimes people were targeted when they returned to Afghanistan, but the source did not see any clear connections simply to the fact that these individuals had left the country. Rather, the targeting seemed to be connected to the reason for their initial departure from Afghanistan. Similarly, another source noted that it was not his impression that Afghans returning from the West would be subject to targeting by the Taliban, unless it was a result of a personal dispute or vendetta ...
Already before the Taliban takeover in 2021, there were accounts of a stigma of those being returned. There was reportedly a common perception that a person must have committed a crime to be deported, or that people returning from Europe were ‘loaded with money’. Out of fear of being harassed or robbed, some did not disclose that they were returnees. A source noted that when people left for Europe, applied for asylum and then involuntarily returned or were deported, they could raise suspicion and questions as regards to what extent they had been ‘contaminated’ by European ways of living. After the takeover, many states suspended deportations of Afghans, while IOM [the International Organization for Migration] and Frontex have stopped activities facilitating or accompanying returns to Afghanistan. Therefore, no recent information is available about individuals being deported or returned from the EU ...
One source reported ... that the Taliban have harassed family members of people who left the country and gave examples of neighbours asking questions about deported individuals’ time in the West, inspecting behaviours, seeking for signs of change, and making assumptions about how they had been impacted. The same source emphasised that apparently minor accusations, such as someone having had a girlfriend or having drunk alcohol in Europe, easily spread and may lead to conflicts ...
The Taliban reportedly have the aim to ‘purify’ Afghan society and eject foreign influence from Afghanistan. Sources noted that individuals seen as ‘Westernised’ may be threatened by the Taliban, relatives, or neighbours. In some cases, men were reportedly harassed by Taliban fighters for wearing Western style clothes or attacked in public because they were seen as ‘traitors’ or ‘unbelievers’ ... some sources described cases of men stopped and harassed by Taliban fighters for wearing Western style clothes or shaving their beards ...
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Other links to the Western countries, such as the teaching and learning of English language could also lead to violence by the de facto authorities. ...
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What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?
The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: the behaviour adopted by the applicant, visibility of the applicant, area of origin and conservative environment, gender (the risk is higher for women), age, duration of stay in a western country, etc.
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3.14.2. Individuals of Hazara ethnicity and other Shias
This profile includes people who belong to the Hazara ethnicity and others belonging to the Shia religion. ... Mostly, persons of Hazara ethnicity are of Shia religion ...
The majority of the Hazara population inhabits the Hazarajat. There are also major Hazara populations in the cities of Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e Sharif ...
The Hazara ethnicity can usually be recognised by the person’s physical appearance.
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Hazaras have historically faced severe abuse, including enslavement, mass killings, and systematic discrimination under different rulers in Afghanistan. Under the previous Taliban rule in 1996-2001, several massacres of Hazaras took place ... Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Hazaras had improved their position in society. However, new security threats emerged for the Shia Muslim (Hazara) community from 2016 and onwards as the ISKP was established as a new armed actor in Afghanistan, carrying out attacks targeting, inter alia, Hazaras ...
a) Treatment by the Taliban
In the months following their coming to power, the Taliban held a series of meetings with Shia Hazara leaders from various parts of the country, promising to provide security for all citizens and expressing the willingness to avoid sectarian divisions ... Also, Hazaras were appointed to posts in the new Taliban administration at central and provincial level to a very limited extent, and it was debated whether these people were regarded as true representatives of the Hazara minority since they had already been part of the Taliban insurgency ...
Despite their promises to provide security, the Taliban failed to protect the Shia Hazara communities as several attacks have been carried out by the ISKP. Moreover, harassment and forced displacement of these communities have increased ...
Members of the Hazara community have been killed during Taliban raids claimed to be targeting ‘armed rebels’, and in Ghazni Province the Taliban de facto security forces opened fire against a group of mourners assembled to commemorate the Shia Ashura ceremony. After the Taliban struck down the dissident Taliban member Mawlawi Mehdi, who was Hazara, in June 2022, reports followed of summary executions of civilians in the district of Balkhab (Sar-e Pul Province), an area with a large Hazara population, where Mehdi based his uprising ...
Sources noted a discrepancy between the Taliban leadership’s public stance towards Hazaras/Shias and the actual treatment of these communities by Taliban rank-and-file security forces. Hazaras have been facing discriminatory acts from Taliban members in local de facto administrative bodies and from the Taliban rank-and-file. According to a source, while the Hazaras have not been facing ‘targeted discrimination’ by the de facto authorities, the local Taliban would ‘view Hazaras negatively and treat them with contempt (in line with historical norms)’ as ‘there is a view’ that Hazaras ‘benefitted too much’ under the previous rule, which must be ‘corrected’ now. As a result, Hazaras have been ‘systematically treated differently’ by the local Taliban according to the same source. The lack of representation has also caused barriers to Hazaras in accessing passport services, and in accessing justice - for example in land disputes. Thousands of Hazaras have been evicted since the Taliban takeover, and in many decade-old land disputes which have reopened, the Taliban have tended to side with (Pashtun) Kuchi nomads ...
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b) Treatment by ISKP
Over recent years, attacks by insurgent groups have mainly been attributed to ISKP. Their intention to target Shias from ‘Baghdad to Khorasan’ has been stated in Telegram channels run by the Islamic State. ISKP consider Shia Muslims to be apostates and, hence, a legitimate target for killing ...
It was described that there have been two patterns of attacks targeting Shia Hazaras after the Taliban takeover. The first pattern consists of attacks mainly targeting civilian passenger vehicles, particularly public transport minivans favoured by ‘young, educated and professional Hazaras’ such as government employees, journalists, and NGO staff. The second pattern consists of large-scale complex attacks, which have inter alia targeted Shia mosques, hospitals, and schools in Hazara-dominated areas, mainly in the cities of Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar, and Kunduz ...
According to the UN, from 30 August 2021 to 30 September 2022, there were 22 recorded attacks against civilians in Afghanistan, 16 of which targeted the Hazara population specifically. Attacks carried out by the ISKP and unknown actors have targeted the Shia Hazara community since the takeover. Human Rights Watch estimated that 700 individuals in total had been killed and injured in such attacks. ...
In 2023, the number of attacks against the Shia Hazara community decreased, and no major attacks were reported between January and September 2023 ... However, ISKP claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against a Shia Mosque in Pul-e Kumri in Baghlan province in October 2023, in which UNAMA reported 21 deaths and 30 injured. Between October 2023 and mid-January 2024, ISKP claimed responsibility for a string of IED attacks in Dasht-e Barchi, a Hazara dominated area in Kabul city. Estimates vary, however around 100 casualties, killing at least 19 people, were reported by UNAMA ... Three targeted attacks killing five Shia religious leaders took place in Herat city in October, November and December 2023. ...
c) Treatment by the society
Hazaras and Shias have reportedly faced discrimination under the Taliban rule. There is also the perception within conservative parts of the Afghan society that the Hazara minority has embraced a culture not in line with the Taliban’s definition of Islam ... A source reported that Hazaras have historically tended to face societal discrimination in Afghanistan ...
As a majority of the Shia Muslims in Afghanistan belong to the Hazara ethnic group, the Hazaras have been the main victims of sectarian targeting against Shias. ...
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What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?
The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for a Hazara and/or Shia applicant to face persecution should take into account their area of origin and whether ISKP has operational capacity there, with those from Hazara-dominated areas in larger cities being particularly at risk.
Being a Hazara may also be a risk-impacting circumstance in relation to other profiles, such as: ... 3.12. Individuals perceived to have transgressed religious, moral and/or societal norms, 3.13. Individuals (perceived as) influenced by foreign values (also commonly referred to as ‘Westernised’) ...”
92 The EUAA’s Country Guidance further noted the following concerning serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict:
De tekst gaat verder: De uitspraak op HUDOC
Aangehaalde artikelen
Aangehaalde uitspraken
- EHRM 29 april 2022, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2022:0429JUD002849215
- EHRM 5 november 2019, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:1105JUD003221817
- EHRM 16 mei 2017, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0516DEC001599309
- EHRM 23 augustus 2016, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0823JUD005916612
- EHRM 5 juli 2016, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0705JUD002909409
- EHRM 23 maart 2016, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0323JUD004361111
- EHRM 9 april 2013, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0409JUD007007310
- EHRM 28 juni 2011, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0628JUD000831907
- EHRM 17 juli 2008, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0717JUD002590407